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1 Introduction
There are ample studies within the input-output (IO) framework that investigate the
issue of identification of so-called ”key sectors” - sectors with the largest potential
of spreading growth impulses throughout the economy. The issue of key sectors
determination is seen to be useful for economic planning, in particular, in developing
countries. From the development strategy point of view, it is reasonable for a country
with a limited amount of financial resources to invest in those few industries, which
have the largest impact on the whole economy through their buying and selling
linkages with all other production units.1 This approach, pioneered by Rasmussen
(1956) and Hirschman (1958), was followed by a vast number of theoretical and
empirical studies, and still constitutes one of the main areas in the IO and regional
economics (see e.g., Strassert, 1968; Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1973; Jones, 1976;
Schultz, 1977; Cella, 1984; Hewings et al., 1989; Heimler, 1991; Dietzenbacher, 1992;
Sonis et al., 1995; Dietzenbacher and van der Linden, 1997; Cai and Leung, 2004;
Cardenete and Sancho, 2006; Midmore et al., 2006; Beynon and Munday, 2008;
Magtibay-Ramos et al., 2008).
However, the meaning of key sectors for economic development is rather debat-
able, since economic growth is determined not only by the structure and strength
of inter-sectoral linkages, but also by production constraints, final demand and em-
ployment structure, imports, institutional and policy settings, income distribution,
and technical and human capital endowment. Therefore, the application of key sec-
tor determination goes beyond examining only production linkages. For example,
Diamond (1975); Meller and Marfa´n (1981); Groenewold et al. (1987, 1993) and Kol
(1991) analyze employment linkages for Turkey, Chile, Australia, and for Indonesia,
South Korea, Mexico and Pakistan, respectively. Gould and Kulshreshtha (1986)
examine the impacts of final demand changes on energy use for Saskatchewan econ-
omy employing linkage analysis. Since according to the classical development eco-
nomics for developing countries economic growth is intrinsically linked to changes
in the structure of production, many studies applied the notion of key sectors to
the analysis of structural change (see e.g., Hewings et al., 1989; Sonis et al., 1995;
Roberts, 1995). Given current concerns about the environmental problems, Lenzen
(2003) focuses on economic structure of Australia in terms of resource use and pollu-
tant emissions by identifying key sectors and linkages that have large environmental
impacts in the form of resource depletion and ecosystem degradation. Similarly,
1It is also true that the overall economic growth depends on the sectoral growth rates, which
are in turn dependent on the linkages between the sectors. Strong linkages provide a possibility of
gaining competitive advantage for industries. For instance, if a sector successfully enters a foreign
market, it will be easier for industries (firms) that have high linkages with this sector to gain access
to the foreign market as well (Porter, 1990; Hoen, 2002).
2
Sa´nchez-Cho´liz and Duarte (2003), extending Rasmussen-type linkages, identify the
key sectors in generating water pollution in the Aragonese economy.
In this paper we focus on the linkage analysis based on a hypothetical extraction
method (HEM), which have become increasingly popular (Miller and Lahr, 2001).
Just to mention a few recent studies, the HEM has been applied in the analysis
of water use (Duarte et al., 2004), for the key sectors identification (Andreosso-
O’Callaghan and Yue, 2004), in the analysis of the economy-wide roles of separate
sectors, such as agriculture sector (Cai and Leung, 2004), construction sector (Song
et al., 2006) and the real estate sector (Song and Liu, 2007). Los (2004) proposes
to identify strategic industries using the HEM in a dynamic IO growth model. The
HEM is also a useful tool to evaluate the significance of a sector in cases of crises-
driven threats of industry shutdowns, which may help governments to decide whether
to support financially the sector under threat or not.2 The main contribution of this
paper to the literature on key sectors identification from the HEM perspective is
that we explicitly formulate the optimization problems of finding a key sector and
a key group of sectors, and derive their solutions in terms of simple measures called
industries’ factor worths. The term ”factor” refers to any indicator that interests
an analyst in identifying the most important industries, which might be a social
factor, such as employment, income, government revenue; or an environmental fac-
tor, such as primary energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, water use, land
disturbance; or an economic/financial factor, such as GDP, gross operating surplus,
export/import propensity; or any combinations of these factors. The important
implications of our formal formulation of the HEM are the following.
Firstly, given that we have found simple measures for quantifying industries’
importance, an analyst does not have to perform a three-step procedure of the HEM
(to be explained in Section 3.1), which becomes, in particular, a rather formidable
task when the number of industries is rather large (say, 100 or more). Secondly,
and more importantly, we distinguish between a key sector problem and a key group
problem and show that the key group of k ≥ 2 sectors is, in general, different from
the set of top k sectors selected on the base of the key sector problem. This is
important, since up to date, to our best knowledge, the linkage literature accepted
the top k sectors from the ranking of individual sectors contributions to the economy-
wide output as the key group. This incongruence is due to the fact that while the
key sector problem looks for the effect of extraction of one sector, the key group
problem considers the effect of a simultaneous extraction of k ≥ 2 sectors that takes
2The threat of downfall of the US car industry in the current financial crisis and debates on
providing massive public spending to the industry can serve one such example. Other examples,
are the downfall of the only Dutch aircraft manufacturer Fokker in 1995-96, and the disappearance
of the Belgian national airline Sabena in 2001, both of which resulted in the shutdown of an entire
national industry (Los, 2004).
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differently into account the cross-contributions of the extracted industries to total
factor arising within and outside the group. This impact is largely dependent on the
similarity/dissimilarity of the linkage patterns of sectors to each other and of their
final demand and factor generation structures. Thirdly, we show that the HEM is
directly related to the fields of influence approach (Sonis and Hewings, 1989, 1992),
which gives an alternative economic interpretation of the HEM problems in terms
of the overall impact on aggregate factor due to an incremental change in sectors’
input self-dependencies. Fourthly, our formulation of the HEM allows to examine a
combined key sector/group problem, where the objective is a combination of several
factors. For instance, one may wish to identify a key sector that has simultaneously
the largest total (direct and indirect) contribution to economy-wide employment
and the least total impact on carbon emissions generation.
Next, we examine the effect of a change in an input coefficient on the factor
importance of an industry. It is shown that a positive (negative) change in the direct
input coefficient arc never decreases (increases) the factor generating importance of
any sector i, and surely increases (decreases) its factor worth if sector r requires
directly and/or indirectly inputs from sector i. The economic interpretations of
such change include, for example, an increase in complexity of technological links
between sectors (or a rise in the density of the input matrix), an increase in sectoral
interdependence, innovation and technological progress, etcetera.
Finally, we establish a bridge between the key linkage analysis in IO economics
and the well established sociology literature on social networks and the booming
literature of network economics on the one hand, and the coalitional game theory
literature on the other. We explore on common grounds of the issues of finding a
key sector in an economy and finding a key player in social networks. In particular,
it is shown that the solution to these two tasks, defined, respectively, in terms of the
factor worth and intercentrality measure are mathematically equivalent, where the
last notion of network centrality was introduced by Ballester et al. (2006). It is also
shown that there is a link to a class of solution concepts in coalitional game literature
on fair allocation of gains obtained from cooperation among the coalition members,
which also translates into defining the power of each member. In particular, we
examine the connection between the industry factor worth and the Shapley value.
In our main empirical application of the key sector/group problem, we use the
1994-1995 Australian input-output tables and satellite accounts at 136 industry-level
classification. We focus our analysis on two environmental, one financial, and one
social factors, which are, respectively, water use, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions,
gross operating surplus (profits), and wages and salaries. It is confirmed that the
key group problem is not equivalent to the key sector problem. Most importantly,
we find that Beef cattle and Electricity supply jointly generate 52.9% of Australian
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total (direct and indirect) CO2 emissions, while Beef cattle, Dairy cattle, and Water
supply, sewerage and drainage services jointly account for 48.1% of overall water
consumption. Hence any attempt to reduce carbon emissions and more efficient use
of water in Australia should target these industries in the first place.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses strengths
and weaknesses of IO analysis, and presents some of its numerous current applica-
tions and extensions. In Section 3.1 we describe the planner’s problem of finding a
key sector, and examine how a change in a direct input coefficient affects the factor
generating importance of industries. Section 3.2 generalizes the key sector problem
to a key group identification problem, whose solution is defined in terms of a group
factor worth of industries. The combined key sector/group problem is examined in
Section 3.3. The link to the sociology, economics of social networks, and coalitional
game theory is explored in Section 4. Section 5 contains results from the empirical
application of the key sector and key group problems to the Australian economy.
Section 6 concludes. In the Appendix we also provide results from application of
the key sector/group problem to the Kyrgyzstan economy in 1997. All proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Strengths and weaknesses of IO analysis
Any analytical model has its own strengths and weaknesses that are directly related
to the validity of the model underlying assumptions. In what follows we first present
the main limitations of Wassily Leontief’s input-output (IO) model as it first ap-
peared in the economics literature, and then briefly discuss how the IO economists
and practitioners broadened its frontiers that in turn led to (complete) relaxation
of some of these assumptions. Also we mention some of the many extensions and
applications IO economics that are currently being used in addressing many kinds
of economic analysis.
Traditionally IO model relied on the following limiting assumptions.
1. Each industry produces only one homogenous product.
2. Output is a linear function of final demand.
3. Technical coefficients are fixed, hence input substitution is not allowed.
4. Production in every industry is subject to constant returns to scale.
5. There are no input constraints, thus supply of inputs is perfectly elastic.
6. Prices and quantities are independent in the sense that IO quantity (price)
model assumes fixed product prices (quantities).
Apparently these assumptions are unrealistic, hence quite restrictive. This also
explains why IO analysis largely known to possess the above characteristics by non-
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IO community is widely believed to be obsolete today. However, as surprising it
may sound this field is still very much alive and its applications go far beyond those
the method was originally designed for (see e.g., Miller and Blair, 2009).3 Some of
the numerous extensions and applications of IO analysis are the following:
• Commodity-by-industry accounting and models. This allows distinction be-
tween sectors and commodities, hence each sector may produce more than one
product, and is the core of IO analysis today. Therefore, assumption 1 above
needed for traditional IO studies is entirely relaxed.
• Interregional, multi-regional, and world IO models. These are designed to con-
sider the complex interrelationships between regions within countries and/or
between countries that are more prominent today due to globalization (see
e.g., Duchin, 2005; Oosterhaven and Polenske, 2009).
• Social Accounting Matrices (SAM) as an extended IO model to capture ac-
tivities of income distribution in the economy in a more comprehensive and
integrated way.
• Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA) to disaggregate the total amount
of some factor into its various components such as, for example, technology
change and final demand change.
• Dynamic IO models.
• Non-survey and partial survey methods, which are used in updating IO tables.
This extension together with SDA and dynamic IO modeling imply that as-
sumption 3 on fixed technical coefficients mentioned above is nowadays not as
crucial as it was earlier, and is relaxed totally or partially (at least) in these
studies.
• Energy and environmental IO analysis. This direction of IO framework usage
is particularly quite popular nowadays, which is partly due to the fact that
industrial ecologist, environmentalists and engineers seek to understand not
only the direct effects but the full economy-wide impact of, say, alternative
technologies for using energy and materials, and/or for generating damaging
emissions (see e.g., the list of references in Foran et al., 2005, vol. 1, pp.
56-71).
• Nonlinear IO models to allow for variable economies of scale.
• Supply-side models, linkages and important coefficients (see e.g., Miller and
Blair, 2009, Chapter 12 and references thereof).
3In the official website of the International Input-Output Association (http://www.iioa.org/)
one can find the ongoing development of the field, which also provides some interesting links to
institutions and projects around the globe that are doing IO research. See also Eurostat Manual
of Supply, Use and Input-Output Tables (2008) at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ (ISBN: 978-
92-79-04735-0).
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• Multiplier decompositions, structural path analysis.
• Linear programming and optimization. This line of IO research considers
explicitly resource constraints and treats price and quantity systems simul-
taneously, hence assumptions 5 and 6 above are no longer needed (see e.g.,
Ten Raa, 2005).
• Stochastic IO models and uncertainty calculus.
• IO econometric models, fundamental economic structure, qualitative IO anal-
ysis, variable IO models (see e.g., Miller and Blair, 2009, Chapter 14).
Also computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are build around IO coeffi-
cients table or SAM framework.4 Ten Raa (2005) considers IO analysis ”... probably
the most practical tool of economic analysis” (p. xii), presents it from a mainstream
economic perspective, and addresses a wide range of economic issues such as, for
example, diagnosis of (in)efficiency of an economy, analysis of international trade,
energy and environmental policy, productivity growth and spillovers, and derivation
of Cobb-Douglas production function from IO coefficients. Dorfman (1995) believed
that ”any list of the four or five major advances in economics during the twentieth
century will include input-output analysis” (p.305), while Baumol (2000) talking
about the benefits of IO analysis states that it ”provides a window to reality” and
”permits applications that really can contribute to the well-being of society” (p.
151).
Evidently, one of the most important strengths of IO analysis is its ability to
capture the extent of complex direct and indirect interconnectedness of sectors,5
which explains why it is currently popular in other fields, for example, in the analysis
of material flows, life cycle assessment, sustainable consumption, energy and climate
change, waste management, etc. (see e.g., Suh, 2009). Also, IO model ”is politically
and ideologically neutral, and does not incorporate any specific behavioral conditions
for the individual, companies or the state, except that an economy behave in a
consistent manner” (Foran et al., 2005, p. 49).6
4Rose (1995) discusses the fact that many CGE modelers distance themselves from IO analysis,
”including those standing on his [Leontief’s] broad shoulders” and states: ”My own use of CGE
models had increased my appreciation on I-O economics rather than diminished it” (p. 296).
5In this regard Augusztinovics (1995) states: ”Who knows what production structures and
mathematical achievements will evolve in the future. Maybe two persons will be sufficient to
supply energy and three to produce food for the whole of humanity on the surface of and around
the globe, a few hundred thousand to teach youngsters via telecommunication and the rest will
be busying themselves on various financial markets or cruising on spaceships in outer space. Even
then, however, there will be a division of labor among them, separating their activities and at the
same time tying them together through direct and endlessly circulating indirect links. ... Even if
Mandelbrot sets will replace the square matrix, such models will be generalized successors of the
original, the pioneering Input-Output” (p. 277).
6”For him [Leontief], economic theory and empirical research had to be closely linked ... .
Amazingly, he was not deterred from thinking of working with the massive amounts of data that
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3 Key sector problem vs. key group problem
3.1 Finding the key sector
The main point of departure is the open static Leontief model (see e.g., Miller and
Blair, 2009), given by x = Ax+ f , where x is the n× 1 endogenous vector of gross
outputs of n sectors, A is the n-square input matrix representing technology, and f
is the n×1 exogenous vector of final demands (including consumption, investments,
and government expenditures).7 The input coefficients aij denote the output in
industry i directly required as input for one unit of output in industry j, hence the
ith element of the vector Ax gives the total intermediate demand of all sectors for
the output of industry i. That is, the fundamental equation of the open Leontief
system states that gross output, x, is the sum of all intermediate demand, Ax, and
final demand, f . The reduced form of the model is
x = Bf , (1)
where B = (I − A)−1 is the Leontief inverse with I being the identity matrix.
Its element bij denotes the output in industry i directly and indirectly required to
satisfy one unit of final demand in industry j. The row vector of output multipliers
is defined as m′o = ı
′B, where ı is a summation vector consisting of ones. Its j-th
element moj =
∑n
k=1 bkj indicates the increase of total output in all industries per
unit increase of final demand in industry j.
For the purpose of identification of important sectors we adopt the hypothetical
extraction method (HEM) originally developed and used by Paelinck et al. (1965),
Strassert (1968) (as cited in Miller and Lahr, 2001) and Schultz (1977), the central
idea of which is briefly as follows. To estimate the importance of sector i to the
economy, delete the i-th row and column of the input matrix A, and then using (1)
compute the reduced outputs in this hypothetical case (the final demand vector also
excludes fi). The difference between total outputs of the economy before and after
the extraction (called ”total linkage”) measures the relative stimulative importance
of sector i to the economy.8
exist in the real world. I can only wonder why other great theorists shy away from such work.”
(Polenske, 2004, p. 25).
7Adopting usual convention, matrices are given in bold, uppercase letters; vectors in bold,
lowercase letters; and scalars in italic lowercase letters. Vectors are columns by definition, and
transposition is indicated by a prime.
8This method was criticized for the reason that it does not distinguish the total linkages into
backward and forward linkages (see e.g., Meller and Marfa´n, 1981; Cella, 1984; Clements, 1990;
Dietzenbacher and van der Linden, 1997). However, we believe that for measuring a sector’s
economy-wide impact it is the most adequate HEM, since setting to zero only a column (row) to
compute the backward (forward) linkages in the non-complete HEM takes only one-sided impact
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However, unlike the traditional HEM approach, we allow for a rather general
definition of importance, which may be used to address various economic, social,
and/or environmental issues.9 For instance, key sectors may be determined accord-
ing to their potential of generating income, emission of greenhouse gases, creating
jobs, or resource use. For the purpose of a general exposition of the HEM prob-
lem, we refer to the various policy-relevant indicators as factors. Let the vector of
direct factor coefficients pi denotes the sectoral factor usage per unit of total out-
put, hence the row vector of factor multipliers is m′pi = pi
′B, and its j-th element
mpij =
∑n
k=1 pikbkj indicates the economy-wide increase of factor usage/production
per unit increase of final demand in industry j.
We are now in a position to address the key sector identification problem. Let
first denote by A−i the new input matrix derived from A by setting to zero all of its
i-th row and column elements. The crucial assumption made (which is usual for all
the HEM approaches) is that in a new system without sector i the input structure
of all sectors j 6= i remains unchanged. From economic point of view, this implies
that foreign (external) industries substitute sector i in providing its output in order
to satisfy the intermediate demand of the remaining industries and the final demand
for commodity i. Although at first glance this assumption seems restrictive, in fact
it is not given our main aim of identifying the importance of sector i. The point
is that by taking all other input coefficients fixed, we explicitly allow the resulting
outcome to depend only on extraction of sector i, which is now not participating
in the ”roundabout” of the production process. The vector of total outputs after
extracting sector i is x−i = B−if−i, where B−i = (I −A−i)−1, and f−i is the same
as f except its i-th entry that is set to zero. The reason for excluding fi in the final
demand vector f−i is that when sector i ceases to exist, its (domestic) output should
be zero, which from (1) is equivalent to fi = 0 (see also e.g., Schultz, 1977; Miller
and Lahr, 2001).
The objective is picking the appropriate sector i, such that its extraction from
the system generates the highest possible reduction in the factor of interest (say,
total income). Formally, the problem is
max{pi′x− pi′x−i | i = 1, . . . , n}. (2)
into account. Moreover, the last two linkage measures are closely related in the sense of the forward-
link involvement problem of backward linkage measures, and, vice versa, the backward-link presence
in the forward linkage measures (see e.g., Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1973; Cai and Leung, 2004).
See Miller and Lahr (2001) for an excellent discussion on all possible extractions, who state that
for the purpose of finding a key sector ”we believe the original hypothetical extraction approach
... is totally adequate - Meller and Marfa´n and other modifications notwithstanding” (p. 429).
9For example, Ten Raa (2005, p. 26) states: ”Output increases induced by a final demand
stimulus are of little interest in themselves. What matters is the income generated by the additional
economic activity.”
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This is a finite optimization problem, which is solvable. A solution to (2) is
denoted by i∗ and is called the key sector. Removing i∗ from the initial production
structure has the largest overall impact on the factor generation. Before solving (2),
let first briefly introduce Sonis and Hewings’ notion of a field of influence, which
is another technique for evaluating a sector’s influence on the rest of the economy
(see e.g., Sonis and Hewings, 1989, 1992).10 Let consider a change of α 6= 0 in only
one coefficient arc, with all other input coefficients being fixed. Then the Leontief
inverse after the change is11
B˜ = B+
α
1− αbcrF(r, c), (3)
where the first-order field of influence of the coefficient arc is F(r, c) = Bere
′
cB and
er is the r-th column of the identity matrix. The sum of all elements of the first-order
field of influence matrix, ı′F(r, c)ı, gives the first-order intensity field of influence
of the direct input arc. In Sonis and Hewings (1989) this concept was introduced
in order to measure the inverse importance of direct inputs. Consequently, those
elements of A whose changes lead to the largest impact on the system are called the
inverse-important coefficients.
To solve (2) we use the following result due to Zeng (2001, Theorem 1, p. 304),
our proof of which is given in the Appendix.12
Lemma 1. Let B and B−i be, respectively, the Leontief inverses before and after
extraction of sector i from the production system, and ei be the i-th column of the
identity matrix. Then B−B−i = 1
bii
Beie
′
iB− eie′i.
Using Lemma 1 after some mathematical transformations, the planner’s problem
(2) can be rewritten as (see Appendix):
max
{
1
bii
pi′F(i, i)f
∣∣ i = 1, . . . , n}. (4)
10This methodology answers the question of how changes in some elements of the input matrix
affect the rest of the system by examining the impact on the elements of the Leontief inverse, and is
general enough to handle changes in one direct coefficient, in all elements of a row or column of the
input matrix, or in all coefficients simultaneously. From economic point of view this enables one
to analyze the effect of technological change, improvements in efficiency, changes in product lines,
changes in the structure and complexity of an economy over time, changes in trade dependency of
a country, etc.
11Notice that ∂b˜ij∂α
∣∣
α=0
= fij(r, c) = birbcj = fcr(j, i). Also the coordinate form of (3) is the well-
know Sherman and Morrison (1950) formula of inverse change as b˜ij = bij + αbirbcj/(1− αbcr).
12Independently, also Ballester et al. (2006, Lemma 1, p. 1411) establish the same result in a
social network framework. We should note that their Lemma 1 is given for a symmetric adjacency
matrix , and does not consider the ii-th element of the difference B − B−i. For asymmetric
case, change mij(g, a) to mji(g, a) in their Lemma 1. Although Ballester et al. (2006) investigate
identification of a key player in social networks, there is a direct link to the key sector problem,
which will be discussed in Section 4.1.
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Re-expression of (2) in terms of the problem (4) clearly shows that the fields of
influence approach and the complete HEM are closely related. This is not surprising
since both deal with the same issue of the impact of a change in input coefficients.
The effect of a change in direct self-dependency of sector i, i.e., a change in the input
coefficient aii, on the Leontief inverse is given by the first-order field of influence
F(i, i). To give more economic interpretation to the problem (4), we introduce the
following terms. In contrast to the standard first-order intensity field of influence
of the input coefficient arc, ı
′F(r, c)ı, the scalar ı′F(r, c)f is termed the output first-
order intensity weighted field of influence of arc, which weights every purchasing
sector in the sum according to the size of its final demand. This makes more sense in
computing the global intensity since every sector is not given an equal importance,
but rather its scale of final demand satisfaction is taken into account. Similarly,
we term the scalar pi′F(r, c)f as the factor first-order intensity weighted field of
influence of the coefficient arc, since the last measures the effect of an input change
on total factor generation rather than gross output. Hence, the planner’s problem
(4) searches for such sector i that, on the one hand, has a large economy-wide impact
on total factor usage/generation due to (incremental) change in its direct input self-
dependency, and on the other hand, is less input dependent on itself directly and
indirectly.
The problem in (2) is equivalent to min{pi′x−i |i = 1, . . . , n}. However, a direct
use of one of these criteria in determining the key sector in empirical applications
forces an analyst to extract different sectors separately and compute the required
objective n times, which becomes a formidable task when n is large. Although with
the modern technology this is not a big issue, problem (4) shows that there exist a
much simpler way to get the desired outcome. We define the factor worth of sector
i as
ωpii (A, f ,pi) =
mpii xi
bii
.
Thus, given the planner’s objective (4) and the fact that pi′F(i, i)f = pi′Beie′iBf =
mpii xi, we have established the following result.
Theorem 1. The key sector i∗ that solves max{pi′x− pi′x−i | i = 1, . . . , n} has the
highest factor worth, i.e., ωpii∗(A, f ,pi) ≥ ωpii (A, f ,pi) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
From Theorem 1 it follows that the standard measure of the high factor multiplier
mpii is not sufficient for sector i to be an optimal target, say, for investments. For the
last, besidesmpii , the size of the sector’s output xi and its total input self-dependency
as indicated by bii are equally important, where the first has a positive effect, while
the second an inverse effect on the worth of sector i.
The traditional gross output approach of the HEM corresponds to the prob-
lem (2) or (4) when a summation vector ı is substituted for the vector of factor
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coefficients pi. The following result is then an immediate outcome of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. The key sector i∗ that solves max{ı′x − ı′x−i |i = 1, . . . , n} has the
highest gross output worth, i.e., ωoi∗(A, f) ≥ ωoi (A, f) for all i = 1, . . . , n, where
ωoi (A, f) = m
o
ixi/bii is the gross output worth of sector i.
Notice that the gross output factor worth of sector i is nothing else as the ”total
linkage” of a sector as defined in the classical HEM approach.
Next we examine how stronger interdependence of sectors affect the factor worth
of sector i. Let the input matrix A˜ represent the more ”complex” input structure
than A, and, without loss of generality, assume that A˜ differs from A only with
respect to the rc-th element that is increased by α > 0. Then it is apparent that
B˜ = I+ A˜+ A˜2 + · · · > I+A+A2 + · · · = B,13 which in turn implies that, given
f and pi, both the numerator and denominator in the definition of the factor worth
of sector i might only increase, hence it is not clear whether ωpii (A˜, f ,pi) is larger or
smaller than ωpii (A, f ,pi). Nevertheless, in Theorem 2 below we are able to show that
a rise in direct input interdependence between two sectors never decreases sector i’s
factor worth, and, moreover, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition under
which such a change surely increases ωpii (A˜, f ,pi).
Theorem 2. Let the input matrix A˜ differ from A only with respect to the rc-th
entry, which has been changed by α 6= 0. Given a nonnegative f with fc > 0 and pi,
if α ≷ 0 then
(i) ωpii (A˜, f ,pi) ≷ ωpii (A, f ,pi) for i = r, c;
(ii) ωpii (A˜, f ,pi) R ωpii (A, f ,pi) for all i 6= r, c, with equality holding if and only if
bir = bci = 0.
One implication of Theorem 2 is that when domestic industries become more in-
terdependent on each other, then the factor generating importance falls for no sector
and surely increases for sectors directly involved in this higher input dependencies.
Moreover, any other sector i’s worth increases as well if bir > 0 and/or bci > 0.
The second implication is that a more efficient technology never increases the factor
worth of any sector for the same vectors of final demand and factor coefficients.
In particular, if, say, due to innovation arc decreases, then sectors r and c’s factor
worths strictly decrease and any other sector i’s importance also weakens whenever
bir > 0 and/or bci > 0. These two conditions in both cases imply that sector i should
either provide (directly and/or indirectly) inputs to industry r and/or uses inputs
(directly and/or indirectly) from sector c.
The straightforward special case of Theorem 2 is when pi = ı, which shows that
the gross output worth of sector i increases (decreases) if the input coefficient arc
13We write X > Y if xij ≥ yij for all i, j, with at least one strict inequality.
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increases (decreases) and sector r purchases inputs directly and/or indirectly from
industry i.
Corollary 2. Assume that the input coefficient arc changes by α 6= 0, i.e., a˜rc =
arc + α. Then, given a nonnegative f with fc > 0, ω
o
i (A˜, f) ≷ ωoi (A, f) for i = r, c,
and ωoi (A˜, f) R ωoi (A, f) for all i 6= r, c whenever α ≷ 0, with equality holding if and
only if bir = bci = 0.
3.2 Finding the key group
Although the linkage literature using the HEM acknowledges the possibility of ex-
traction of several industries, the theoretical analysis does not go beyond describing
it using partitioned matrices to the reduced form of the Leontief model (see e.g.,
Miller and Lahr, 2001). This, however, is quite complex to implement empirically
since one has to consider all possible combinations of certain number of industries
from totality of n sectors (correspondingly changing the members and nonmembers
of partitioned matrices) in order to determine the most important group of sectors,
which explains why there is no any empirical study that explicitly focuses on the
role of several industries simultaneously. Hence, in all studies, to the best of our
knowledge, the HEM was applied to only one sector, and the most important in-
dustries were defined to be those with the largest individual contributions to total
output (or any other factor).
In this section we wish to fill this gap in the literature, generalizing the key
sector problem from the previous section to the key group problem. Similar to the
notion of individual key sector, a key group of k ≥ 2 sectors is defined as the group
of industries, whose removal from the production system has the largest impact
on the factor consumption/generation.14 Since the two problems are inherently
different, we expect that, in general, the top k sectors with the largest factor worths
do not compose the key group, which is also confirmed in the empirical application
in Section 5. The underlying reason for this outcome is that industries can be
redundant (or, equivalently, similar to each other) with respect to their linkage
patterns to other sectors and their capabilities of factor generation. Hence, all other
things being equal, targeting industries with the same linkage characteristics might
not be an optimal policy strategy and instead choosing sectors with heterogenous
linkage structures will have the largest impact on the factor usage/generation.
The planner’s objective is now to pick k (1 ≤ k ≤ n) sectors i1, i2, . . . , ik (is 6= ir)
14Note that if the factor generation is unfavorable from societal point of view (e.g., an increase in
CO2 emissions has detrimental consequences) and the policy-makers want to find the least harmful
industries to target on, then the key group will be defined as those industries that have the smallest
impact on the factor generation.
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such that their extraction from the production structure generates the largest impact
on the overall factor consumption/generation, i.e.,
max{pi′x− pi′x−{i1,...,ik} |i1, . . . , ik = 1, . . . , n; is 6= ir}, (5)
where x−{i1,...,ik} = B−{i1,...,ik}f−{i1,...,ik}, and the superscript −{i1, . . . , ik} refers to
the situation when sectors i1, i2, . . . , ik are hypothetically extracted from the econ-
omy. Note that along the similar reasonings made in Section 3.1, f−{i1,...,ik} is exactly
the same as f but with fis = 0 for all s = 1, . . . , k. The solution to (5) is denoted
by {i∗1, i∗2, . . . , i∗k} and is called the key group of size k.
The following important identity characterizes the changes in all elements of
the Leontief inverse when a group of k sectors is hypothetically extracted from the
production system.
Lemma 2. Let B−{i1,...,ik} be the Leontief inverse after extraction of sectors i1, i2, . . . , ik
from the production system, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and ei be the i-th column of the iden-
tity matrix. Then the identity B − B−{i1,...,ik} = BE (E′BE)−1E′B − EE′ always
holds, where E is the n× k matrix defined as E = (ei1 , . . . , eik).
Note that Lemma 1 is just a special case of Lemma 2 with k = 1. We should
also note that the k extracted sectors can be arbitrary ordered, hence the matrix E
can have different ordering of the identity columns corresponding to those sectors.15
Using Lemma 2 it can be shown that the problem in (5) is exactly equivalent to
(see Appendix)
max
{
pi′BEB−1kkE
′Bf =
pi′F[(i1, i1), . . . , (ik, ik)]f
|Bkk|
∣∣∣∣i1, . . . , ik = 1, . . . , n; is 6= ir},
(6)
where Bkk = E
′BE, |Bkk| is the determinant of Bkk, and F[(i1, i1), . . . , (ik, ik)] is
the matrix field of influence of order k of the coefficients ai1i1 , ai2i2 , . . . , aikik .
Note that the key player problem (4) is a particular case of (6) when k = 1. So
the overall impact on the Leontief inverse of a simultaneous incremental change in
coefficients ai1i1 , . . . , aikik is given by the matrix F[(i1, i1), . . . , (ik, ik)], and thus the
scalar ı′F[(i1, i1), . . . , (ik, ik)]ı is the standard intensity field of influence of order k of
the corresponding input coefficients. Due to similar reasonings made in Section 3.1,
we term the scalar ı′F[(i1, i1), . . . , (ik, ik)]f as the output intensity weighted field of
influence of order k of the input coefficients ai1i1 , . . . , aikik , which unlike the standard
global intensity weights each purchasing sector according to its net output. Similarly,
15Notice that if k = n and E = I, then B −B−{i1,...,ik} = B − I, which is expected. However,
in this case also E does not have to be an identity matrix, but E being any permutation matrix of
order n gives the desired result.
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pi′F[(i1, i1), . . . , (ik, ik)]f can be termed as factor intensity weighted field of influence
of order k of ai1i1 , . . . , aikik that measures the effect of changes in these coefficients
on factor generation/usage.16 Now define the group factor worth of sectors i1, . . . , ik
(ir 6= is) as
ωpii1,...,ik(A, f ,pi) =m
′
piEB
−1
kkE
′x.
The following result then follows from the planner’s problem (6).
Theorem 3. For 1 ≤ k ≤ n the key group of size k {i∗1, i∗2, . . . , i∗k} that solves
max{pi′x − pi′x−{i1,...,ik} |i1, . . . , ik = 1, . . . , n; is 6= ir} has the highest group factor
worth, i.e., ωpii∗1,...,i∗k(A, f ,pi) ≥ ωpii1,...,ik(A, f ,pi) for all i1, . . . , ik = 1, . . . , n with is 6=
ir.
Hence, in line with the key sector problem, the planner’s problem (5) searches for
a group of k sectors with the highest k-th order group factor worth, which is directly
proportional to the impact on overall factor generation of an incremental changes
in direct input self-dependencies of the sectors comprising the group, and inversely
related to their unit own net input dependence that excludes the indirect role of
the group members. To see the interpretation of the second effect, let consider the
group of size two. Then |B22| = biibjj − bijbji, which gives the net input dependence
per unit of output of sectors i and j (6= i) on themselves. This follows since bijbji
(or, equivalently, bjibij) gives the total input requirements of sector i (j) on itself
through sector j (i), and excluding this from the total own dependence of sectors i
and j, biibjj, gives the unit own input dependence through other sectors k 6= i, j.17
When the key group of size k is searched in the spirit of the traditional HEM
approach, Theorem 3 implies the following result.
Corollary 3. For 1 ≤ k ≤ n the key group of size k {i∗1, . . . , i∗k} that solves
max{ı′x − ı′x−{i1,...,ik} | i1, . . . , ik = 1, . . . , n; is 6= ir} has the highest group out-
put worth, i.e., ωoi∗1,...,i∗k(A, f) ≥ ωoi1,...,ik(A, f) for all i1, . . . , ik = 1, . . . , n with is 6= ir
and ωoi1,...,ik(A, f) =m
′
oEB
−1
kkE
′x.
While the key sector problem looks for the effect of extraction of one sector,
the key group problem considers the effect of a simultaneous extraction of k ≥
2 sectors. This implies that the two problems are not equivalent since the key
group problem takes into full account all the cross-contributions of the extracted
16Using the analytical formula for matrix inverse it is easy to show that, for example, the factor
second-order intensity weighted field of influence of sectors i and j (6= i) is pi′F[(i, i), (j, j)]f =
bjjm
pi
i xi + biim
pi
j xj − bijmpii xj − bjimpij xi.
17In case of three sectors, one may write |B33| = bkk(biibjj − bijbji) − bjk(biibkj − bkibij) −
bik(bjjbki − bkjbji) for all i 6= j 6= k 6= i which has the same interpretation of the net own input
dependence of sector k. Other orderings of rows (and columns) of Bkk give similar interpretation
for the other two sectors i and j.
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sectors to the overall factor that is used/generated both within and outside the
group. For example, if two industries are perfectly identical with respect to their
linkages patterns (including input coefficients’ sizes) and more or less also similar
in terms of their final demand and factor generation structure, then their group
worth is expected to be less than that of the group, which consists of one of the
mentioned sectors together with another industry that has quite different patterns
of (significant) interindustry linkages and factor generation ability. The redundancy
principle is well-known in the sociology literature on social networks that emphasizes
the redundancy of actors with respect to adjacency, distance, and bridging (see e.g.,
Burt, 1992; Borgatti, 2006). Arguing that the information and control benefits
of a large and diverse network are more than those of a small and homogeneous
network, Burt (1992, p.17), for example, states: ”What matters is the number of
nonredundant contacts. Contacts are redundant to the extent that they lead to the
same people, and so provide the same information benefits.” Taking redundancy
into account is crucial in determining the most important group in social networks
(see Everett and Borgatti, 1999, 2005; Temurshoev, 2008). In the IO framework,
however, it is not only the redundancy of sectors with respect to their production
linkage that matters, but also the similarity of the structures of sectors final demands
and factor production is important in determining the key group.
In general, within the IO framework, we expect that k (≥ 2) sectors with the
largest individual factor worths will not be much different from the key group of size
k only if the IO tables are highly aggregated. Otherwise, the difference should be
in place, and will largely depend on the structures of the production system, direct
factor coefficients and final demands.
3.3 The combined key sector/group problem
Nowadays policy-makers, governments, companies and the general public are all
becoming engaged with the phenomenon of ”sustainability”, which was brought to
the public attention by environmental movements about 30 years ago that mainly
emphasizes the issue of some sort of tradeoff between economic development and en-
vironmental quality. Hence, the concept of sustainable development is becoming the
main focus, which requires meeting increasing environmental concerns along with
maintaining economic development. For this reason corporations are beginning to
be more and more involved in using the so-called triple bottom line (TBL) account-
ing through which economic, social and environmental spheres of sustainability are
assessed and reported (see e.g., Henriques and Richardson, 2004). Further, at the
country level Foran et al. (2005) develop a numerate TBL account of the Australian
economy with ten indicators that accounts for the full supply chain approach using
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IO analysis, against which many management issues at lower (say, firms) levels can
be benchmarked.
The generalized HEM approach proposed in this paper can be applied to the
sustainable development policy design and analysis.18 The key group problem (5)
can easily accommodate the notion of TBL approach from the HEM perspective. Let
take the economic, social and environmental factors in the example of value-added,
employment and CO2 emissions, respectively. If v, l and c denote, respectively, the
direct value-added, labor and CO2 coefficients vectors, the total (direct and indirect)
value-added, employment and CO2 emissions that is generated to satisfy the final
demand f is equal to v′x, l′x and c′x, correspondingly. Then a combined key sector
and a combined key group problems are given, respectively, by problems (2) and (5)
with the direct factor coefficients defined as pi = v + l − c. Note that since CO2
generation is unfavorable, its direct coefficients are entered with a minus sign in the
definition of pi. Also notice that factors written is this form can have an economic
meaning only if they are all expressed in the same measurement unit. This can be
done, for example, by multiplying the number of jobs by a price so that employment
is expressed in some common for all factors currency term (like in the index number
literature). Or, one might assign appropriate weights to each factor that is included
in the combined factor coefficients vector. For instance, we may write l = tvj, where
the (number of) jobs coefficients j is expressed in terms of currency using the weight
tv =
v′x
j′x that indicates the value of value-added per one (full-time) job. Theorems 1
and 3 are then similarly used to identify the key sector and the key group of certain
size in these combined problems.
4 Connection to social network analysis and game
theory
4.1 The link to the economics of social networks
One of the topical issue in sociology literature is the problem of identifying a key
player in a social network. Different measures of network centralities were proposed
18An example of such policy is given by Daniels (1992): since the 1980s Australia has expanded
its exports of meat, wool, wheat and non-ferrous metals to maintain revenues and living standards
in response to increasing foreign debts and falling primary commodity prices. However, since
these exports are highly environmental damaging activities, ”Australia became locked into an
environmental-economic dilemma through increasing dependency on degrading production and
further erosion of environmental quality. Daniels argued that, in order to avoid long-term losses
of productivity, biodiversity and real income, Australia has to re-direct its domestic production
towards more value-adding and less land- and emissions-intensive commodities” (Lenzen, 2003, p.
29).
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for this purpose, such as rank prestige, centralities of degree, closeness, betweenness
and information (see e.g., Katz, 1953; Sabidussi, 1966; Freeman, 1979; Bonacich,
1987; Stephenson and Zelen, 1989).19 From an economic point of view, the impor-
tant feature of network games is that actors’ payoffs depend on each other through
the network embeddedness.20 A set of players each choose a level of some activity
in a game, where there are negative global externalities (e.g., competition) and local
positive externalities (e.g., learning, cooperation) that come through the network.
This system has feedback effects, which are taken into account in the Nash equilib-
rium activity levels. Recently, this network game was analyzed by Ballester et al.
(2006, henceforth BCZ), who show that its individual equilibrium level is propor-
tional to the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure from the sociology literature, hence
provide to the Katz and Bonacich indices behavioral foundation ”singling [them] out
from the vast catalogue of network measures” (p. 1404). They also propose a new
measure, named intercentrality measure, that finds a key player with the maximum
influence on overall activity. In what follows, we briefly present a simple version
of BCZ (2006) model, and discuss the link between the intercentrality measure and
the factor worth proposed in this paper.
Players are connected by a network g with adjacency matrix G, which is sym-
metric, zero-diagonal, and non-negative square matrix with the typical element
gij = {0, 1} for all i 6= j. If players i and j (6= i) are connected, then gij = 1,
otherwise gij = 0. Each player i = 1, . . . , n selects a contribution yi ≥ 0 and gets
the bilinear payoff
ui(y,g) = yi − 1
2
y2i + a
n∑
j=1
gijyiyj, (7)
which is strictly concave in own contribution, ∂2ui/∂y
2
i = −1 < 0, hence marginal
utility of player i is decreasing in own activity level. We set a > 0 to capture
the network payoff (relative) complementarities across all pairs of actors, which are
reflected by the cross-derivatives ∂2ui/∂yi∂yj = agij ≥ 0 for i 6= j. That is, marginal
utility of actor i is increasing in actor j’s contribution if gij = 1, otherwise there is
no direct effect.
Denote the largest eigenvalue of G by µ(G) > 0. Then if aµ(G) < 1, the matrix
M(g, a) = (I − aG)−1 = ∑+∞k=0 akGk is well defined,21 and its coefficients mij(g, a)
count the number of paths in g starting at i and ending at j, where paths of length
k are weighted by ak. Hence, the parameter a is a decay factor that scales down the
19A thorough discussion of centrality and many more reference can be found in Wasserman and
Faust (1994, pp. 169-219).
20Economists mainly use modern game theoretical tools in analyzing social networks (see e.g.,
Goyal, 2007; Jackson, 2008).
21This follows from Theorem III* in Debreu and Herstein (1953, p. 601).
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weight of longer paths. The vector of Katz-Bonacich (KB) centralities of parameter
a in g is h(g, a) =M(g, a)ı, and its i-th component hi(g, a) =
∑n
j=1mij(g, a) indi-
cates the total number of direct and indirect paths in g that start from position i.22
Note that, similar to the Leontief inverse property, mii(g, a) ≥ 1, hence hi(g, a) ≥ 1
with equality holding when i is an isolate.
From Theorem 1 in BCZ (2006) it is easy to see that for aµ(G) < 1, the unique
Nash equilibrium of the game is y∗ = h(g, a). One can also easily derive that the
equilibrium utility of player i is ui(y
∗,g) = hi(g, a)2/2. This shows that individual
equilibrium outcomes are directly related to the KB centrality measures. Next, let
consider a key player in the framework of social networks. The key player i∗ is
a solution to the planner’s problem max{ı′y − ı′y−i |i = 1, . . . , n}, which is very
similar to the problem (2) in Section 3.1. Removing i∗ from the network g has the
highest overall impact on the aggregate equilibrium contribution. The intercentrality
of player i of parameter a in g, where G can be non-symmetric,23 is defined by
ci(g, a) =
[∑n
j=1mji(g, a)
]
× hi(g, a)
mii(g, a)
. (8)
Obviously, when G is symmetric as in our game, then mji(g, a) = mij(g, a),
thus the intercentrality measure reduces to ci(g, a) = hi(g, a)
2/mii(g, a). While KB
centrality of actor i counts the number of direct and indirect paths in g stemming
from i, the ”intercentrality counts the total number of such paths that hit i; it
is the sum of i’s Bonacich centrality and i’s contribution to every other player’s
Bonacich centrality” (Ballester et al., 2006, p. 1411). Theorem 3 in BCZ (2006)
shows that the key player i∗ has the highest intercentrality, i.e., c∗i (g, a) ≥ ci(g, a)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. In their Example 1, the authors show that the most central
player (i.e., with the highest KB centrality) is not the key player for relatively large
a. This follows since then indirect effects matter and, as the intercentrality takes
into account both a player’s centrality and his contribution to the centrality of the
others, key player with the highest joint direct and indirect effect on aggregate
outcome might be very well other than the most central player.
Now consider the relation of the key player problem to the key sector problem
discussed is Section 3.1. We have defined the (general) factor worth and its particular
22In fact, Bonacich (1987) defines the network centrality measure by the vector t(g, a, b) =
b(I− aG)−1Gı, where the parameter b ”affects only the length of the vector [t(g, a, b)]”(p. 1173).
It is not difficult to show that h(g, a) = ı + at(g, a, 1). This measure is directly related to the
status measure k(g, a) = ( 1aI−G)−1Gı, introduced by Katz (1953), since k(g, a) = at(g, a, 1) =
h(g, a)− ı.
23Non-symmetric matrices play crucial role in networks of directional relations.
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case of output worth of sector i, respectively, as
ωpii (A, f ,pi) =
mpii xi
bii
, and ωoi (A, f) =
moixi
bii
.
The matrixM(g, a) = (I−aG)−1 has exactly the same properties as the Leontief
inverse, B = (I −A)−1, where the core of the key player analysis is the adjacency
matrixG of the network g, while that role in the key sector identification is assigned
to the input matrix A. First, comparing the above definitions with the intercentral-
ity measure (8), note that the diagonal elements of the matrices B and M(g, a)
appear in their denominators. Recall that bii indicates the own gross output that is
required directly and indirectly for one unit of final demand of sector i, and mii(g, a)
is the total (direct and indirect) number of paths in g that start at i and end at i, or,
equivalently, the number of self-loops of player i. The first terms in the numerator
of the factor and output worths are, respectively, the factor (say, income) and out-
put multipliers, mpii =
∑n
j=1 pijbji and m
o
i =
∑n
j=1 bji that are mathematically very
similar to the first term in the numerator of (8),
∑n
j=1mji(g, a), which indicates
the total number of paths from all players that end at position i. The second term
in the numerator of (8) is the KB centrality hi(g, a) =
∑n
j=1mij(g, a), while the
corresponding component for both factor worth and its counterpart of output is the
gross output of sector i, xi =
∑n
j=1 bijfj. The last terms will be mathematically
more similar if gross output would be expressed per unit of final demands of all
sectors, i.e., fi = 1 for all i.
24
We have shown that the factor worth is mathematically equivalent to the concept
of the intercentrality measure. This is not surprising since the key sector problem
and key player problem address conceptually the same issue, finding a sector or an
actor that has the largest overall impact on the aggregate outcome.25 Of course, the
interpretations are totally different given their underlying theoretical frameworks.
In the analysis of social networks directionality of relations between players and
valuation of those links generates four basic types of social network data: binary
nondirected, binary directed, valued nondirected, and valued directed ties. Binary
data indicates only the presence or absence of ties between pairs of actors, while val-
ued data besides presence or absence of a tie also quantify the intensity or frequency
of interactions. In nondirected graph the relation is mutual, while in digraph the
relation is not always reciprocal, hence the origin and the end of links are distin-
24If we would have parameter αi in the utility function (7) placed before yi, then the weighted
KB centrality measure is defined as hα(g, a) = (I− aG)−1α, so that the role of the final demand
vector f in the IO framework would be taken by the vector α in the network game (BCZ, 2006,
Remark 1).
25Temurshoev (2008) extends the study of BCZ (2006) from the key player search to a key group
search.
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guished. In our IO analysis of the key group, however, the network of industries is
always represented by valued directed data (and possibly graphs).
4.2 The link to the coalitional game literature
A question of a fair allocation of gains obtained from cooperation among several
actors was one of the main focus at the outset of game theory. The setup is simple:
cooperation of actors results in a certain overall gain that has to be divided among
the actors within the coalition. However, the last is not a trivial issue given that ac-
tors have different contributions to the coalition. The legitimate question is then how
to allocate fairly the gain from cooperation to its participants. Or in other words,
how important each actor is to the coalition, and what payoff they deserve? One ap-
proach is to use a Shapley value, named in honor of Lloyd Shapley, who introduced
it in his classical 1953 paper ”A value for n-person games”. Using an axiomatic
approach, Shapley constructed a solution remarkable for its intuitive definition and
unique characterization by a set of reasonable axioms. The specialization of Shapley
value to simple games26 is often used as an index of voting power and is known as
the Shapley-Shubik power index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954). Other related indica-
tor is a Banzhaf power index proposed in Banzhaf (1965).27 The generalization of
Shapley and Banzhaf values to coalitional structure, where the interaction between
players is not symmetric in a sense that actors may be part of different groups,
which might make negotiations between groups impossible, is studied, in particular,
by Aumann and Dre`ze (1974) and Owen (1977, 1981).28 A share function solution of
van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) assigns every player its share in the worth
of the grand coalition, and contains the Shapley share function and the Banzhaf
share function as special cases. Solution in terms of share functions for games with
coalitional structure is introduced in van der Laan and van den Brink (2002). Since
all these values are closely related to the original contribution of Shapley (1953), in
what follows, we will only discuss the link of the factor worth to the Shapley value.
Formally, a coalitional form game on a finite set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is
a function v from the set of all coalitions 2N to the set of real numbers R, with the
properties
26See Shapley (1962) for details on simple games.
27Straffin (1977, 1988) interprets the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices as the probabilities
of affecting the voting outcome. In particular, it is shown that the Shapley-Shubik index is more
appropriate measure of probability of a voter influence when voters’ decisions are correlated (eg.,
a society judging welfare by common standards), while the Banzhaf index is more appropriate if
voters behave independently of each other.
28Cooperative games with coalitional structure imply a two-level interaction between the players
(see eg., Hart and Kurz, 1983). Firstly, the value of the grand coalition is distributed amongst the
coalitions, and secondly, the worth of each coalition is allocated amongst the players within this
coalition. See also, Winter (1989, 1992); Owen and Winter (1992).
21
1. v(∅) = 0,
2. v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ), whenever S ∩ T = ∅.
Interpretation of v(S) is the expected total payoff (gain or rent) that the coalition
S can get in the game v. The second property, so called superadditivity condition,
implies that cooperation can only benefit players, and never makes them worse off.
The Shapley value (φ) is one way to distribute the total gain to all players, and
assigns to each game v a vector of payoffs φ(v)′ = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn) in Rn. Alter-
natively, one can think of φi(v) as the measure of i’s power in the game v. For
all S ⊆ N and all i ∈ S, the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S in
game v is defined by v(S)− v(S \{i}). Shapley constructed the following value that
assigns an expected marginal contribution of each player in the game with respect
to a uniform distribution over the set of all permutations on the set of players:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N,i∈S
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[
v(S)− v(S \ {i})], (9)
where s is the cardinality of S, i.e., s = |S|. In words, φi(v) is averaging marginal
contributions of player i over the possible different permutations of coalitions, since
i’s marginal contribution to coalition S is, first, multiplied with the (s−1)! different
permutations of the members of coalition S aside from player i and the (n − s)!
different permutations of players outside the coalition S, then divided by the n!
different permutations of all the players in the grand coalition N , and the results
are summed over all the coalitions S to which player i belongs.
Shapley value satisfies the following four axioms.
Efficiency :
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N), i.e., the resources available to the grand coali-
tion are precisely distributed amongst all the players.
Symmetry : If v(S∪{i}) = v(S∪{j}) for every subset S ⊂ N with i, j 6∈ S, then
φi(v) = φj(v). That is, if players i, j ∈ N make the same marginal contribution
to any coalition S that contains neither i nor j, then i and j are symmetric with
respect to game v, and have equal shares.
Dummy : If i is a dummy (or null) player, i.e., v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for all S ⊂ N ,
then φi(v) = 0. This axiom requires that players with zero marginal contribution
to every coalition are given zero payoffs.
Additivity : For any two games v and w on a set N of players, φi(v+w) = φi(v)+
φi(w) for all i ∈ N , where v + w is the game defined by (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S).
This axiom requires that the value is an additive operator on the space of all games.
The remarkable finding of Shapley (1953) is that there exist a unique value that
satisfies these four simple axioms, and it is the Shapley value given in (9).29 Now
29For more details see e.g., Roth (1988); Winter (2002).
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we are in a position to compare the factor worth ωpii (A, f ,pi) = m
pi
i xi/bii with the
Shapley value. These two indicators are similar in the sense that both assess the
power of an agent on the base of its marginal contribution. The difference, however,
is that the factor worth focuses on the marginal contribution of a sector to the total
factor generated by production sectors taken altogether (see (2)), while the Shapley
value takes into account the marginal contributions of a player to all permutations
on the set of players.
To see clearly the similarities and distinctions, we will check weather the factor
worth satisfies the above mentioned four axioms. In the framework of the IO analysis
the value of all industries is the resulting aggregate factor, pi′x. It can be shown that∑n
i=1 ω
pi
i (A, f ,pi) > pi
′x (see Appendix), that is, the sum of the individual factor
worths of all sectors is strictly larger than the total factor that all the industries
generate/use. In other words, the factor worth does not satisfy the efficiency axiom
in the context of the coalitional game. The symmetry property, however, holds in the
key sector framework, which is an expectable outcome. Two sectors i and j with the
same individual contributions to overall factor have identical factor worths, which
follows from the fact that ωpii (A, f ,pi) = m
pi
i xi/bii = pi
′(x − x−i) = pi′(x − x−j) =
mpij xj/bjj = ω
pi
j (A, f ,pi). Although, factor worth satisfies the third axiom of dummy,
it does not make sense to have a null sector in the IO framework. When pi′(x−x−i) =
0, it necessarily implies that sector i does not purchase inputs from any sector in
the economy and does not supply intermediate inputs to all domestic industries.
Therefore, the null sector would be a sector that buys all its intermediate inputs from
abroad, and provides its output to the final demand categories only, which is entirely
unrealistic case. Finally, Section 3.3 on the combined key sector problem implies
that the additivity property of the Shapley value is also satisfied in case of the factor
worth. If we would define the combined factors worth by ωv,li (A, f ,v, l), where v and
l are the direct sectoral value-added and labor coefficients, respectively, then from
the factor worth definition it follows that ωv,li (A, f ,v, l) = ω
v
i (A, f ,v) + ω
l
i(A, f , l),
which is the additivity condition in the context of the coalitional game literature.
All in all, we have shown that the Shapley value and the factor worth are intuitively
closely related, but their applications are quite different given that they are the
outcome of the two entirely different frameworks.
5 Application to the Australian economy
We have already noted that the input-output linkage studies (implicitly) accepted
the k sectors (where 1 < k < n) with the largest individual factor worths as the
key group of k sectors. In this section by an example of the Australian economy
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we show that this is not true as long as the HEM approach is concerned, i.e., the k
sectors with the highest factor worths, in general, do not compose the key group of
size k.
We have used data from Foran et al. (2005) and Centre for Integrated Sustain-
ability Analysis (2005) that include the 1994-1995 Australian IO tables and satellite
accounts at 136 industry-level classification.30 For simplicity, the industries were
codified, whose list is given in Table 4 in the Appendix. The key sector/group
problem is performed for two environmental, one financial and one social factors,
which are, respectively, water use, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, gross operating
surplus, and wages and salaries. The results are reported in the first five columns
of Table 1 in terms of relative group factor worths, i.e., the group factor worths
as a percentage of the overall factor use/generation before the extraction of sectors
comprising the group. For instance, the relative profits (gross operating surplus)
worth of sectors i and j (6= i) equals (ωpi,j(A, f ,p)/p′x)× 100, where p is the vector
of sectoral direct profits coefficients, thus p′x is the total gross operating surplus
in the economy. Hence, these relative measures refer to the percentage decrease in
economy-wide factor use/generation caused by the extraction. We only report the
top 5 groups of size k ∈ [1, 4], where obviously the group with rank 1 in each list is
the corresponding key group.
Several observations can be made from Table 1. The first and most obvious
observation is that different objectives give different composition of the key group
of certain size and different rankings of sectors or group of sectors. This is totally
expectable, as different sectors perform different functions in the economy, thus
should not be equivalent it terms of their contributions to the overall consump-
tion/production of various factors.
Second outcome is that the composition of the key group of size k is, in general,
different from the k sectors with the largest (individual) factor worths, which con-
firms our expectation that the key sector problem is not equivalent to the key group
problem. For example, let us look at the key group problem in terms of water use.
The second column of Table 1 shows that Dairy cattle & milk (Dc) is the key sector
in water use with the relative water consumption worth of 19.5%.31 The key group
of size two consists of the key sector Dc and Beef cattle (Bc) jointly accounting for
37.6% of the economy-wide water consumption, which, however, does not include
Diary products (Dp) that has the second largest water (usage) worth. Further, the
key group of size 3 besides Dc and Bc includes Water supply, sewerage and drainage
services (Wa), which has only the sixth rank according to the key sector problem
30Foran et al. (2005) give detail description of the data sources and its construction.
31In the language of the HEM problem, if Dairy cattle & milk (Dc) sector would be eliminated
from the economy then the overall use of water would be reduced by 19.5%.
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with water worth of 10.6% (not shown in Table 1). The traditional ”top-list” ap-
proach would consider the ”key” group of size 4 consisting of dairy and beef cattle,
and dairy and meet products (i.e., Dc, Dp, Bc and Mp as the top 4 sectors with the
largest individual water usage worths), while the formal key group problem finds
beef and diary cattle (Bc, Dc), Vegetable and fruit growing (Vf), and Water supply,
sewerage & drainage (Wa) to be the part of the key group. The legitimate question
is why the ”top-list” approach does not give the true outcome identified by the key
group problem.32 The group factor worth of sectors i1, . . . , ik can be rewritten as
ωpii1,...,ik(A, f ,pi) =
ik∑
s=i1
pisxs +
∑
j 6=i1,...,ik
pij
(
xj − x−{i1,...,ik}j
)
,
which shows that the factor worth of the extracted sectors includes not only their
direct contributions to factor usage/generation (the first sum), but also their indirect
contributions to factor consumed/produced by every other sector outside the group
(the second sum).33 Hence, with inherently different structures and sizes of inter-
sectoral links, and intermediate and final demands, the group of k sectors will play
quite a different role in overall factor usage/generation process than a single industry,
in particular, through its indirect channel.
This result wedges a bridge between the IO linkage analysis and the sociology
literature on actors’ importance in social networks. This link has to do with what
sociologists call a redundancy principle (see e.g., Burt, 1992; Borgatti, 2006), which
in our framework means that sectors may be redundant with respect to their linkage
patterns, factor generation abilities and final demand structures. For example, sec-
tors can be redundant when they connect the same third industries to each other, or
when they are connected to the same third parties, in both cases with approximately
the same sizes of inter-industry transactions, factor generation, and final demands.
Sectors are called to be structurally equivalent in the latter case of redundancy in the
sociological terminology. In the framework of social networks, Temurshoev (2008)
extended a notion of intercentrality measure introduced by Ballester et al. (2006)
in identifying a key player from social planner perspective to a group intercentrality
measure, and showed that there is a link between the key group members (that
32Note that in our example these two approaches give identical results for k ∈ [1, 4] when the
objectives are profits, and wages and salaries. We should, however, stress that these observations
by no means can subside the existence of the difference between the two approaches, and thus the
key group problem should always be given preference over the ”top-list” approach whenever the
HEM is the study methodology. Application to the Kyrgyzstan economy for value-added and gross
output also confirm the difference between the ”top-list” and the key group problem approaches
in defining the key group. These results are shown in the Appendix.
33Note that in the case of gross output being the objective, i.e., when pii = 1 for all i, the
group output worth equals the sum of gross outputs of the extracted sectors and their indirect
contributions to every other sectors’ gross outputs.
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are ex ante identical) and clusters of similar agents, where clusters are identified
by a hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis. That is, the key group generally
contains members from different clusters, i.e., key group members are rather nonre-
dundant with respect to the patterns of ties to their alters provided that the agents
are ex ante identical. We believe that namely this redundancy principle in the IO
framework explains the fact that Dairy products (Dp) that ranks high in the key
sector problem (i.e., for k = 1) is not contained in key groups of size k > 1 in
Table 1 in the case of water usage. For example, key group of size 2 contains dairy
cattle and beef cattle (Dc and Bc) and not the second largest consumer of water -
Dairy products (Dp), simply because dairy cattle and dairy products (Dc and Dp)
have rather similar patterns of production linkages, water usage and final demand
structure than those of dairy cattle and beef cattle (Dc and Bc).34
The third observation from Table 1 is that sectors in the key group of size k are
also part of the key group of size k + 1, which raises a question of whether this is
a general property or is a mere coincidence. It turns out that this is not true in
general, i.e., the group target selection problem is not equivalent to a sequential key
sector problem.35 (The author can supply an interested reader by a hypothetical IO
table that confirms the last statement.) One might (rightly) think that this fact is
unfortunate from computational perspective, since this urges an analyst to compute
the factor worths for all possible combinations of k from all n sectors, which, for
instance, in our case with group of size 4 required to consider more than 13.6 million
combinations,36 and that search process would be significantly reduced (i.e., to only
133 cases) if the key group problem and the sequential key sector problem would be
equivalent. Given that we have conjectured that the key group members are rather
34This can be proved formally using cluster analysis, which is, however, beyond the scope of this
paper. In this respect, our study has a link to Hoen (2002), who analyzes the groups of sectors
with strong connections using different cluster identification methods and ends at choosing a block
diagonalization method to suit best for clustering purpose. This method rearranges sectors in such
a way that the important linkages (bigger than some specified threshold level) of a matrix (such
as the intermediate values, input coefficients, Leontief inverse) appear in blocks along the main
diagonal, and thus sectors in one block comprise one separate cluster. However, a word of caution
is in place with respect to diagonalization method: it does not allow for ”cluster switching”. For
instance, Howe and Stabler (1989) showed that an object may be assigned to totally different
cluster if the number of identified clusters changes. In fact, this property of block diagonalization
Hoen (2002) considers positively as other ”cluster methods ... did not show this phenomenon [i.e.,
cluster switching] for sectors” (p. 139). However, the HEM allows for sector switching if one
interprets the key group members in terms of different clusters’ membership, at least, theoretically
(see the next observation).
35By a sequential search we mean the following: once the key group of size k has been identified,
one needs only to add to this group an extra sector from all possible n− k remaining industries in
order to identify the key group of size k + 1.
36This computation in a PC with a memory (RAM) of 4 GB and a Windows Experience Index
base score of 4.6 took overall 17 minutes and 44 seconds. The MATLAB program can be provided
by the author upon request. However, we should note that the time mentioned might be reduced
if one is capable of writing a more efficient program for such computation.
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nonredundant with respect to their linkage patterns, factor generation capability
and final demand structure, and, thus, should be part of different clusters with
similar impacts, this result allows, at least theoretically, for ”cluster switching” of
sectors between clusters once the number of (identified) clusters changes.37 The
phenomenon of ”cluster switching” have been found, for example, in Howe and
Stabler (1989). Hence, the fact that the key group problem requires to search for
all possible combinations is, in fact, advantageous as it reveals cases of ”cluster
switching” if they do exist.
The forth observation is that in Australia in 1994-1995 a group of few industries
accounted for the majority of the environmental factors, while generation of profits
and salaries is relatively dispersed among sectors. So 58% and 53% of, respectively,
water (direct and indirect) consumption and CO2 emissions are due to the key groups
of size 4 and 2 from the total of 136 sectors. This has, for example, the following
policy implication: focusing on a very few industries would give quite a big impact in
terms of, say, CO2 emissions, but in order to have large effect on social factors gener-
ation many more industries should be given some policy priority. More specifically,
we can see that Electricity supply (El) alone accounts for 32.8% of the Australian
carbon dioxide emissions, while other factor worths (i.e., for water use, profits and
wages generation) of key sectors are much smaller. Only Beef cattle (Bc) and Elec-
tricity supply (El) (members of the key group of size 2) generate 52.9% of Australian
CO2 emissions, hence any attempt to reduce carbon emissions should target these
industries in the first place (say, by encouraging reduction of CO2 emission intensity
in these sectors, or as suggested by Daniels (1992, see fn. 18), Australia has to
re-direct its production from these high emissions-intensive industries towards more
value-adding sectors). Our analysis is complementary to Lenzen’s (2003) study, who
in his IO structural path analysis finds electricity generation for private final con-
sumption as the most important path (of zero order) in producing CO2 emissions
(see Table 3, p. 22), and second in his list is the second-order path originating from
Beef cattle (Bc) to Meat products (Mp) for exports, since ”Beef cattle for exported
meat product ... alone ... is responsible for ... 37.5 Mt CO2-e of greenhouse gases...”
(p. 27). Note that Meat product (Mp) is a member of, at least, groups of sizes 2 and
3 with the second largest group CO2 emissions worths in Table 1. In case of water
use, the key sector is Dairy cattle (Dc), while Beef cattle (Bc), Dairy cattle (Dc)
37To see this consider the following hypothetical case with four sectors. Suppose there are three
clusters: {1,2}, {3} and {4} and the key group of size three is {1,3,4}. It might very well happen
that in reducing the number of clusters we get the following two clusters: {1,3} and {2,4}, in which
case sector 2 ”switches” from its original cluster {1,2} to the cluster {4}. Then, in this ”cluster
switching” case the key group of size two can be, for example, {1,4}. Note that in this case the
key group of size 2 is a part of the key group of size 3, which does not have to be necessarily true
in general.
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and Water supply, sewerage and drainage services (Wa) jointly account for 48.1%
of water consumption. Hence, again any policy towards more efficient use of water
must consider these mentioned industries in the first place. Here, also our results
are complementary to those found in Lenzen (2003) with different IO apparatus of
structural path analysis, who then similarly mentions that ”... in order to reduce
the irrigation-induced stress on the Murray-Darling river system in South-Eastern
Australia, shifts in production from water-intensive industries towards more value-
adding sectors have been recommended” (p. 29). Analogous conclusions can be
made with respect to the two other factors of profits and wages.
The last observation is that the percentage decrease in overall factor usage/
production upon extraction of groups is always smaller than the sum of the individ-
ual relative factor worths of sectors comprising the group. This mathematically is
equivalent to
∑k
s=1 ω
pi
is(A, f ,pi) > ω
pi
i1,i2,...,ik
(A, f ,pi) for all k = 2, 3, . . . , n (the proof
is available from the author upon request), which exactly reflects the redundancy
principle in the IO framework discussed above. Note that, however, summation
of percentages of the relative factor worths for given k does not have an economic
meaning in itself as these relative worths do not sum up to 100% due to the fact
that each sector’s (or group’s) contribution is examined under the assumption that
the rest of the sectors are active.
In order to compare the results of the generalized HEM to other indicators, in
the last three columns of Table 1 we present the top 5 sectors with the largest factor
multipliers, direct factor usage/generation, and factor responsibility. The first two
indicators do not need additional explanation, hence we briefly discuss the third
one. Multiplying the diagonalized matrix of the factor coefficients vector by the
Leontief inverse gives the matrix pˆiB, whose ij-th element shows the amount of
factor used/produced by sector i per unit final demand of sector j. Hence, the ij-th
entry of the matrix pˆiBfˆ is the amount of the factor used/generated by sector i due to
final demand of sector j, or equivalently, how much factor was consumed/produced
by sector i for sector j. Thus, summing over all i’s gives the amount of the factor
consumed/produced by all industries for sector j, which is the j-th element of the
vector pi′Bfˆ . In other words, this is the amount of the factor that sector j is
responsible for, hence the term ”responsibility”.38
Multipliers are traditionally used to identify the importance of sectors. Table1,
however, shows that factor multipliers can give quite different results than those
based on the HEM approach. This is expectable since factor worths besides the
size of multipliers also take into account sectors’ gross outputs size and net input
dependencies. Rice (Ri) has the highest water use multiplier (7470 litres per A$ of
38See Hoen and Mulder (2003) for similar computation in analyzing the Dutch CO2 emissions.
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its final demand), while it is not a member of the key groups of size k ∈ [1, 4], and,
moreover, it does not show up in the list of the top 5 groups at all. Rice (Ri) though
is the 5-th largest direct consumer of water (1.43 Tl), it is not in the list of the top
5 responsible sectors. In case of CO2 emissions, Forestry (Fr) has the largest CO2
multiplier, but it is not a member of the key group of size k < 3. For gross operating
surplus all four indicators give quite close outcomes with Ownership of dwellings
(Dw) being the most important sector in all respect. Education (Ed) has the largest
wages multiplier, and becomes a member of the key group of size 4. All in all, these
results do not mean that factor multipliers are useless from policy perspective. The
advantage of multipliers lies in the price evaluation of commodities as multipliers
are expressed per unit of final demand. In other words, industries with high factor
multipliers are sensitive to changes in the factor price (see e.g., Dietzenbacher and
Vela´zquez, 2007). In our case a pricing policy that tries to internalize the costs
of using water and CO2 emissions will have the largest impact on the prices of,
respectively, Rice (Ri) and Forestry (Fr).39
Notice also that for water use and CO2 emissions there is a perfect correspon-
dence between the key group members and the list of sectors with the largest direct
factor usage/generation in Table 1 . But this is not always the case: the largest ca-
pacity of generating wages has Education (Ed, 14.6 Bln A$), which is not a member
of the key group of size k < 4. Instead, Retail trade (Rt), which is responsible for
the largest amount of wages (18.3 A$), is part of the key group of size k ≥ 2. For
water usage and CO2 emissions Dairy products and Meat products (Dp and Mp)
are respectively the most responsible sectors, while in both cases they do not show
up as a part of the key groups. However, these industries are members of groups
that are second in the list. All in all, it seems that the HEM approach takes into ac-
count both sectors’ direct factor consumption/generation and sectors’ responsibility
in using/generating the factor by other industries. This is, of course, the specific ad-
vantage of using the generalized HEM proposed in this paper, which fully considers
all kinds of interlinkages associated with the hypothetically extracted sector(s).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the issue of identification of a key sector and a key
group of sectors in the economy by a complete hypothetical extraction method
39In this respect Foran et al. (2005) regarding agricultural, forestry and food products in Aus-
tralia state: ”... the prices we pay for the products reflect the marginal cost of production, rather
than the full resource and environmental costs of production. ... Moves to internalize the full costs
of production in the final price of the market product may mean substantial price increases” (p.
1).
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(HEM). We show that for this purpose the analyst does not have to perform the
three step procedure of the HEM: delete the corresponding row(s) and column(s) of
the input matrix, calculate the overall factor usage/production in the hypothetical
case, and find the difference between the actual and hypothetical objectives. These
steps are rather excessive given that we have found quite simple formulas (measures
of industries’ factor worths) in getting the desired outcome.
We showed that the key sector problem and the key group problem have, in
general, different solutions. This is demonstrated in the empirical applications of
the mentioned problems to the Australian economy for four factors of water use,
CO2 emissions, profits, and wages and salaries, and to the Kyrgyzstan economy for
total income and gross output that is given in the Appendix. In general, the key
group has the highest group factor worth, which is directly related to the overall
impact on aggregate factor usage/generation of an incremental changes in direct
self-dependencies of the sectors comprising the group, and inversely related to own
net input dependence of the group members. The last interpretation is the result
of linking the HEM to the fields of influence method. It is proved that an increase
(resp. decrease) in an input coefficient never decreases (resp. increases) the factor
worth of any sector. In both cases the necessary and sufficient condition for a strict
change is that the sector supplying more per unit depends directly and/or indirectly
on a sector whose worth is going to change.
In case of Australia, we found that in 1994-1995 out of 136 industries Beef
cattle and Electricity supply jointly generated 52.9% of total (direct and indirect)
CO2 emissions, while Beef cattle, Dairy cattle, and Water supply, sewerage and
drainage services jointly accounted for 48.1% of overall water consumption. Hence
any attempt to reduce carbon emissions and more efficient use of water in Australia
should target these industries in the first place.
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Appendix
A. Key group vs. key sector in the Kyrgyzstan economy
We use 1997 IO table in current prices of the Kyrgyzstan economy (constructed by the
National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic) that has 34 industry classifications
(see Table 3). The results of the key sector/group problems in Table 2 are again given in
terms of relative group income and output worths, thus measure the percentage decrease
in economy-wide income and output caused by the extraction.
Table 2: Relative group income and output worths of sectors in Kyrgyzstan, 1997
Ranking
Group of size k and its relative income and output worth (%)
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5
Objective: national income
1 (key) 1 (43.99) {1,22} (55.47) {1,20,22} (62.18) {1,4,20,22} (67.93) {1,4,16,20,22} (72.33)
2 22 (13.34) {1,20} (51.02) {1,4,22} (61.25) {1,16,20,22} (66.70) {1,4,20,22,30} (72.20)
3 6 (11.89) {1,4} (49.93) {1,16,22} (60.22) {1,12,20,22} (66.54) {1,4,6,20,22} (71.94)
4 20 (7.70) {1,28} (49.55) {1,12,22} (59.88) {1,20,22,30} (66.44) {1,4,20,22,28} (71.82)
5 28 (6.21) {1,16} (48.0) {1,22,30} (59.74) {1,6,20,22} (66.20) {1,4,7,20,22} (71.48)
Objective: gross output
1 (key) 1 (32.88) {1,22} (43.03) {1,12,22} (52.01) {1,12,20,22} (60.44) {1,6,12,20,22} (67.53)
2 6 (13.48) {1,12} (42.05) {1,20,22} (51.56) {1,6,12,22} (59.14) {1,12,20,22,29} (65.72)
3 22 (11.67) {1,20} (41.71) {1,12,20} (50.78) {1,6,20,22} (58.69) {1,7,12,20,22} (64.97)
4 20 (9.34) {1,6} (40.83) {1,6,22} (50.20) {1,6,12,20} (58.63) {1,4,6,20,22} (64.54)
5 12 (9.27) {1,4} (38.92) {1,6,12} (49.96) {1,4,20,22} (57.43) {1,12,16,20,22} (64.31)
Total 34 561 5984 46376 278256
”Total” is the total number of all possible groups of size k. Mathematically, it is equal to the combinations of n = 34
sectors taken k at a time, Cnk = n!/(k!(n− k)!).
Table 3: Sectoral classification of the Kyrgyzstan 1997 IO Table
No. Industry description No. Industry description
1 Agriculture and hunting 18 Steam and hot water supply
2 Forestry and fishing 19 Water generation, purification and distribution
3 Coal, crude oil and gas production 20 Construction
4 Ore extraction 21 Wholesale trade
5 Other minerals (mining) industries 22 Retail trade
6 Food, beverages, and tobacco 23 Car sale and servicing of private & house use goods
7 Textile and leather manufacture 24 Hotels and restaurants
8 Wood and wood products 25 Transportation, subsidiary transport activities
9 Paper, printing and paper products 26 Post and communication services
10 Chemicals, rubber & plastic manufacturing 27 Finance
11 Other non-metallic mineral products 28 Operations with real estate, rent & business services
12 Metallurgy industry 29 Government administration
13 Finished metallic products 30 Education
14 Machinery and equipment 31 Public health and social services
15 Other manufacturing, secondary processing 32 Environmental purity protection services
16 Electricity 33 Unions, rest, culture and sports activities
17 Gas fuel production and distribution 34 Rendering individual services
An interested reader can see that all the four observations made from the similar
results on Australian economy hold also for the Kyrgyzstan case. Notice, however, that
the structure of these countries are entirely different. For instance, the key sector in
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generating overall income in Kyrgyzstan in Agriculture and hunting (sector 1), while the
Australian key sectors in generating profits and salaries are, respectively, Ownership of
dwellings (DW) and Wholesale trade (Wt). This is, of course, entirely expectable given
the level of economic development in these two countries, where one is mainly agricultural
based (developing) economy and the other is service-based (developed) country.
B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We give our proof within the IO framework. First note that the
matrix I − eie′i has ones in all diagonal entries except for its ii-th position, and zero
otherwise. Hence, A−i = (I − eie′i)A(I − eie′i). We make use of the well-known formula
of the inverse of a sum of matrices (see e.g., Henderson and Searle, 1981):
(X−UD−1Z)−1 = X−1 +X−1U(D− ZX−1U)−1ZX−1, (A1)
(X+ uz′)−1 = X−1 − 1
1 + z′X−1u
X−1uz′X−1. (A2)
Since eie′ieie
′
i = eie
′
i (as e
′
iei = 1), one can easily confirm that (I− eie′i)(I− eie′i) =
I− eie′i. Then using (A1) it follows that
B−i = (I− (I− eie′i)A(I− eie′i))−1 = I+ (I− eie′i)[A−1 − (I− eie′i)]−1(I− eie′i). (A3)
Using (A1) again we can write the Leontief inverse as B = (I−A)−1 = I+(A−1−I)−1,
which implies that (A−1 − I)−1 = B − I. This together with (A2) allows us to write the
inverse in the right-hand side (rhs) of (A3) as:
((A−1 − I) + eie′i)−1 = B− I−
1
bii
(B− I)eie′i(B− I), (A4)
where the last follows since e′i(B−I)ei = bii−1. Plugging (A4) in (A3) and using the fact
that e′iBei = bii, some simple matrix multiplication yields B
−i = eie′i + B − 1biiBeie′iB,
which completes the proof.
Derivation of problem (4). The objective function in problem (2) is pi′x − pi′x−i =
pi′(Bf − B−if−i). Adding and subtracting B−if to the expression in the brackets gives
pi′x − pi′x−i = pi′(B −B−i)f + pi′B−i(f − f−i). It is apparent that f − f−i = fiei. This
together with Lemma 1 yields
pi′x− pi′x−i = pi′
(
1
bii
Beie′iB− eie′i
)
f + fipi′
(
B− 1
bii
Beie′iB+ eie
′
i
)
ei
=
1
bii
pi′Beie′iBf − fipii + fipi′Bei −
fi
bii
pi′Beie′iBei + fipii
=
1
bii
pi′Beie′iBf + fipi
′Bei − fi
bii
pi′Beie′iBei =
1
bii
m′pieie
′
ix,
where the last term follows since e′iBei = bii.
Proof of Theorem 2. Using the definitions of the factor worth, factor multiplier and
equation (1), we have ωpii (A, f ,pi) =
1
bii
mpii xi =
(∑n
j=1 pijbji
)∑n
j=1
bij
bii
fj . Then,
∆pii ≡ ωpii (A˜, f ,pi)− ωpii (A, f ,pi) =
 n∑
j=1
pij b˜ji
 n∑
j=1
b˜ij
b˜ii
fj −
 n∑
j=1
pijbji
 n∑
j=1
bij
bii
fj ,
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where b˜ij is a generic element of B˜ = (I−A˜)−1. Adding and subtracting
(∑
j pij b˜ji
)∑
j
bij
bii
fj
to the last expression and noting that m˜pii =
∑n
j=1 pij b˜ji yields
∆pii = m˜
pi
i
n∑
j=1
(
b˜ij
b˜ii
− bij
bii
)
fj +
( n∑
j=1
pij(b˜ji − bji)
)
xi
bii
. (A5)
From (3) (see also fn. 11) it follows that b˜ij = bij + ibcj , where i = αbir/(1− αbcr).
Therefore,
b˜ij
b˜ii
− bij
bii
=
bij + ibcj
bii + ibci
− bij
bii
=
i(biibcj − bcibij)
bii(bii + ibci)
.
Plugging the last expression in (A5) and using b˜ij = bij + ibcj after some simple
algebraic transformations we obtain
∆pii =
α
bii(1− αbcr)
[
bir
m˜pii
b˜ii
n∑
j=1
(
biibcj − bcibij
)
fj + bcim˜pirxi
]
. (A6)
The well-know property of the Leontief inverse is that bii ≥ 1 and bii > bij ≥ 0 for all
i and all j 6= i. Theorem 1 in Zeng (2001) shows that biibcj ≥ bcibij , with strict inequality
holding when j = c 6= i. Hence, ∑j(biibcj − bcibij)fj > 0 for all i 6= c (assuming that at
least fc > 0). It is not difficult to see that for i = c every term in this sum is zero, hence
the first term of ∆pic in (A6) (when i = c) vanishes, however, its second term is positive as
bcc ≥ 1. So it always holds that ∆pic ≷ 0 if α ≷ 0, and this is also always the case when
i = r, i.e., ∆pir ≷ 0 for α ≷ 0 as brr ≥ 1. However, for all other i 6= r, c the expression
within the square brackets in (A6) is not always positive, and becomes zero whenever
bir = bci = 0 in which case ∆pii = 0 for all i 6= r, c. Otherwise, if bir > 0 and/or bci > 0
the sign of ∆pii for i 6= r, c will depend only on α, and is positive (resp. negative) if α > 0
(resp. α < 0). This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Lemma 1 in Temurshoev (2008) in the framework of social network
analysis in mathematically equivalent to Lemma 2 in this paper. Hence, see the proof of
Lemma 1 in Temurshoev (2008).
Derivation of problem (6). As in derivation of problem (4), the objective function in
problem (5) can be rewritten as pi′x−pi′x−{i1,...,ik} = pi′(B−B−{i1,...,ik})f+pi′B−{i1,...,ik}(f−
f−{i1,...,ik}), where f − f−{i1,...,ik} =∑ks=1 fiseis = EE′f . This together with Lemma 2 and
the fact that EE′EE′ = EE′ gives
pi′x− pi′x−{i1,...,ik}
= pi′
[
BEB−1kkE
′B−EE′] f + pi′ [B−BEB−1kkE′B+EE′]EE′f
= pi′BEB−1kkE
′Bf −EE′f + pi′BEE′f − pi′BEB−1kkE′BEE′f +EE′f
= pi′BEB−1kkE
′Bf + pi′BEE′f − pi′BEB−1kkBkkE′f = pi′BEB−1kkE′Bf ,
Using the fact that for a nonsingular matrix X the identity
∣∣∣∣ X bc′ 0
∣∣∣∣ = −|X|(c′X−1b)
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holds, we can write the hl-th element of the matrix BEB−1kkE
′B as follows
b′h•B
−1
kk b•l =
−
∣∣∣∣ Bkk b•lb′h• 0
∣∣∣∣
|Bkk| ,
where b′h• is the h-th row of the matrix BE and b•l is the l-th column of E
′B. The
numerator in the last equation is nothing else as the hl-th element of the matrix field
of influence of order k, F[(i1, i1), (i2, i2), . . . , (ik, ik)], due to incremental changes in input
coefficients ai1i1 , ai2i2 , . . . , aikik (see e.g., Fritz et al., 2002).
40
40We should note that the only difference comes in signs when k is even, i.e., in the fields of
influence approach the determinant in the numerator of the last equation is multiplied by (−1)k.
However, we believe that in our setting it should be always multiplied by minus, otherwise the
elements will be negative, which then contradict the Leontief inverse property.
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Table 4: Codes assigned to 136 Australian sectors
Sym. Industry Sym. Industry
Ac Insecticides, pesticides and other agricultural chemicals Lm Lime
Ai Aircraft Lp Leather and leather products
Al Aluminium alloys and aluminium recovery Ma Agricultural, mining and construction machinery
Ao Alumina Mi Mineral and glass wool and other non-metallic mineral
products
Ap Automotive petrol Mn Exploration and services to mining
At Air and space transport Mp Meat and meat products
Ba Barley, unmilled Ms Legal, accounting, marketing and business management
services
Bc Beef cattle Mv Motor vehicles and parts, other transport equipment
Bk Banking Nb Non-residential buildings, roads, bridges and other con-
struction
Bl Black coal Ne Newspapers, books, recorded media and other publish-
ing
Bm Beer and malt Nf Non-ferrous metal recovery and basic products
Bp Bread, cakes, biscuits and other bakery products Ng Natural gas
Br Brown coal, lignite Oc Adhesives, inks, polishes and other chemical products
Bs Typing, copying, staff placement and other business ser-
vices
Oe Photographic, optical, medical and radio equipment,
watches
Bt Bus and tramway transport services Of Oils and fats
Bu Prefabricated buildings Oi Crude oil
Bv Soft drinks, cordials and syrups Om Coins, jewellery, sporting goods and other manufactur-
ing
Bx Bauxite Os Police, interest groups, fire brigade and other services
Cc Concrete and mortar Ot Cable car, chair lift, monorail and over-snow transport
Ce Cement Pa Paper containers and products
Cg Services to agriculture, ginned cotton, shearing and
hunting
Pc Petroleum bitumen, refinery LPG and other refinery
products
Ch Basic chemicals Pd Property developer, real estate and other property ser-
vices
Cl Clothing Pe Poultry and eggs
Cm Communication services Pg Pigs
Cn Confectionery Ph Pharmaceutical goods for human use
Co Copper Pi Pipeline transport services
Cp Plaster and other concrete products Pl Plastic products
Cr Bricks and other ceramic products Pp Pulp, paper and paperboard
Cs Childminding and other community care services Pr Printing, stationery and services to printing
Ct Cosmetics and toiletry preparations Ps Hairdressing, goods hiring, laundry and other personal
services
Cu Libraries, parks, museums and the arts Pt Paints
Dc Dairy cattle and untreated whole milk Rb Residential building, construction, repair and mainte-
nance
De Soap and other detergents Rd Road freight transport services
Df Defence Rf Railway freight transport services
Dp Dairy products Rh Repairs of household and business equipment
Dw Ownership of dwellings Ri Rice, in the husk
Ed Education Rp Railway passenger transport services
Ee Cable, wire, batteries, lights and other electrical equip-
ment
Rs Sport, gambling and recreational services
El Electricity supply Rt Retail trade
En Electronic equipment, photocopying, gaming machines Ru Rubber products
Eq Pumps, bearings, air conditioning and other equipment Rv Repairs of motor vehicles, agricultural and other ma-
chinery
Et Motion picture, radio and television services Rw Railway equipment
Fc Flour, cereal foods, rice, pasta and other flour mill prod-
ucts
Sb Ships and boats
Fd Raw sugar, animal feeds, seafoods, coffee and other
foods
Sc Seed cotton
Fe Mixed fertilisers Sf Security broking and dealing and other services to fi-
nance
Fi Commercial fishing Sg Sand, gravel and other construction materials mining
Fm Nuts, bolts, tools and other fabricated metal products Sh Sheet containers and other sheet metal products
Fn Money market corporation and other non-bank finance Si Financial asset investors and holding company services
Fo Gas oil, fuel oil Sm Frames, mesh and other structural metal products
Fp Vegetables, fruit, juices and other fruit and vegetable
products
Sp Water transport
Fr Forestry and services to forestry St Travel agencies, forwarding and other services to trans-
port
Fu Furniture Su Sugar cane
Fw Footwear Sw Softwoods, conifers
Ga Gas production and distribution Sz Silver and zinc ores
Gd Sanitary and garbage disposal services Ta Taxi and hired car with driver
Gl Gold and lead Ti Sawn timer, woodchips and other sawmill products
Gp Glass and glass products To Tobacco products
Gv Government administration Tp Carpets, curtains, tarpaulins, sails, tents and other tex-
tiles
Hh Household appliances and hot water systems Ts Scientific research, technical and computer services
Ho Accommodation, cafes and restaurants Tx Processed wool, textile fibres, yarns and woven fabrics
Hs Health services Uo Uranium, nickel, tin, manganese and other non-ferrous
metal ores
Hw Hardwoods, brushwoods, scrubwoods, hewn and other
timber
Vf Vegetable and fruit growing, hay, plant nurseries, flowers
In Insurance Wa Water supply, sewerage and drainage services
Io Iron ores Wh Wheat, legumes for grain, oilseeds, oats and other grains
Is Basic iron and steel, pipes, tubes, sheets, rods, bars,
rails, fittings
Wo Sheep and shorn wool
Ke Kerosene and aviation jet fuel Wp Plywood, window frames, doors and other wood prod-
ucts
Kn Knitting mill products Ws Wine and spirits
Lg Liquefied natural gas, liquefied natural petrol Wt Wholesale trade
36
References
Andreosso-O’Callaghan, B. and G. Yue: 2004, ‘Intersectoral linkages and key sectors in
China, 1987-1997’. Asian Economic Journal 18, 165–183.
Augusztinovics, M.: 1995, ‘What Input-Output is about’. Structural Change and Eco-
nomic Dynamics 6, 271–277.
Aumann, R. J. and J. H. Dre`ze: 1974, ‘Cooperative games with coaltion structures’.
International Journal of Game Theory 3, 217–237.
Ballester, C., A. Calvo´-Armengol, and Y. Zenou: 2006, ‘Who’s who in networks. Wanted:
the key player’. Econometrica 74, 1403–1417.
Banzhaf, J. F.: 1965, ‘Weighted voting doesn’t work: a mathematical analysis’. Rutgers
Law Review 19, 317–343.
Baumol, W. J.: 2000, ‘Leontief’s great leap forward: beyond Quesnay, Marx and von
Bortkiewicz’. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 12, 141–152.
Beynon, M. N. and M. Munday: 2008, ‘Stochastic key sector analysis: an application to
a regional input-output framework’. Annals of Regional Science 42, 863–877.
Bonacich, P.: 1987, ‘Power and centrality: a family of measures’. American Jounal of
Sociology 92, 1170–1182.
Borgatti, S. P.: 2006, ‘Identifying sets of key players in a social network’. Computational
and Mathematical Organization Theory 12, 21–34.
Burt, R. S.: 1992, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge:
Hardvard Univeristy Press.
Cai, J. and P. Leung: 2004, ‘Linkage measures: a revisit and a suggested alternative’.
Economic System Research 16, 65–85.
Cardenete, M. A. and F. Sancho: 2006, ‘Missing links in key sector analysis’. Economic
Systems Research 18, 319–325.
Cella, G.: 1984, ‘The input-output measurement of interindustry linkages’. Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics 46, 73–84.
Centre for Integrated Sustainability Analysis, I. S. A.: 2005, ‘Triple Bottom Line accounts
of the Australian economy’. Unpublished data, The University of Sydney, Sydney,
Australia.
Clements, B. J.: 1990, ‘On the decomposition and normalization of interindustry linkages’.
Economics Letters 33, 337–340.
Daniels, P. L.: 1992, ‘Barriers to sustainable development in natural resource-based
economies: Australia as a case of study’. Society and Natural Resources 5, 247–262.
Debreu, G. and I. N. Herstein: 1953, ‘Nonnegative square matrices’. Econometrica 21,
597–607.
37
Diamond, J.: 1975, ‘Inter-industry indicators of employment potential’. Applied Eco-
nomics 7, 265–273.
Dietzenbacher, E.: 1992, ‘The measurement of interindustry linkages: key sectors in the
Netherlands’. Economic Modelling 9, 419–437.
Dietzenbacher, E. and J. van der Linden: 1997, ‘Sectoral and spartial linkages in the EC
production structure’. Journal of Regional Science 37, 235–257.
Dietzenbacher, E. and E. Vela´zquez: 2007, ‘Analysing Andalusian virtual water trade in
an input-output framework’. Regional Studies 41, 185–196.
Dorfman, R.: 1995, ‘In appreciation of Wassily Leontief’. Structural Change and Economic
Dynamics 6, 305–308.
Duarte, R., J. Sa´nchez-Cho´liz, and J. Bielsa: 2004, ‘Water use in the Spanish economy:
an input-output approach’. Ecological Economics 43, 71–85.
Duchin, F.: 2005, ‘A world trade model based on comparative advantage with m regions,
n goods, and k factors’. Economic Systems Research 17, 141–162.
Everett, M. G. and S. P. Borgatti: 1999, ‘The centrality of groups and classes’. Journal
of Mathematical Sociology 23, 181–201.
Everett, M. G. and S. P. Borgatti: 2005, ‘Extending centrality’. In: S. J. Carrington,
Peter J. and W. Stanley (eds.): Models and Methods in Social Network Analysis. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57–76.
Foran, B., M. Lenzen, and C. Dey: 2005, Balancing Act - A Triple Bottom Line Analysis
of the Australian Economy. Internet site http://www.isa.org.usyd.edu.au, Canberra,
ACT, Australia, CSIRO Resource Futures and The University of Sydney.
Freeman, L. C.: 1979, ‘Centrality in social networks: conceptual clarification’. Social
Networks 1, 215–239.
Fritz, O., M. Sonis, and G. J. Hewings: 2002, ‘Direct and indirect industrial pollution
generation: a field of influence approach’. In: G. J. Hewings, M. Sonis, and D.
Boyce (eds.): Trade, Networks and Hierarchies. Modeling Regional and Interregional
Economies. Berlin: Spriger-Verlag, pp. 433–443.
Gould, B. W. and S. N. Kulshreshtha: 1986, ‘An interindustry analysis of structural
change and energy use linkages in the Saskatchewan economy’. Energy Economics 8,
186–196.
Goyal, S.: 2007, Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks. New Jersey:
Princeton Univeristy Press.
Groenewold, N., A. Hagger, and J. R. Madden: 1987, ‘The measurement of industry
employment contribution in an input-output model’. Regional Studies 21, 255–263.
Groenewold, N., A. Hagger, and J. R. Madden: 1993, ‘Measuring industry importance:
an Australian application’. Annals of Regional Science 27, 175–182.
38
Hart, S. and M. Kurz: 1983, ‘Endogenous formation of coalitions’. Econometrica 51,
1047–1064.
Heimler, A.: 1991, ‘Linkages and vertical integration in the Chinese economy’. Review of
Economics and Statistics 73, 261–267.
Henderson, H. V. and S. R. Searle: 1981, ‘On deriving the inverse of a sum of matrices’.
SIAM Review 23, 53–60.
Henriques, A. and J. Richardson (eds.): 2004, The Triple Bottom Line: Does it All Add
Up? London: Earthscan.
Hewings, G. J., M. Fonseca, J. J. Guilhoto, and M. Sonis: 1989, ‘Key sectors and structural
change in the Brazilian economy: a comparison of alternative approaches and their
policy implications’. Jounal of Policy Modeling 11, 67–90.
Hirschman, A.: 1958, The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Hoen, A. R.: 2002, ‘Indentifying linkages with a cluster-based methodology’. Economic
Systems Research 14, 131–146.
Hoen, A. R. and M. Mulder: 2003, ‘Explaining Dutch emissions of CO2; a decomposition
analysis’. CPB Discussion Paper 24.
Howe, E. C. and J. C. Stabler: 1989, ‘Canada divided: the optimal division of an economy
into regions’. Journal of Regional Science 29, 191–211.
Jackson, M. O.: 2008, Social and Economic Networks. Princeton Univeristy Press.
Jones, L. P.: 1976, ‘The measurement of Hirshmanian linkages’. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 90, 323–333.
Katz, L.: 1953, ‘A new status index derived from sociometric analysis’. Psychometrica
18, 39–43.
Kol, J.: 1991, ‘Key sectors, comparative advantage, and international shifts in employ-
ment: a case study for Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico and Pakistan and their trade
relations with the European Community’. In: W. Peterson (ed.): Advances in Input-
Output Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 199–210.
Lenzen, M.: 2003, ‘Environmentally important paths, linkages and key sectors in the
Australian economy’. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 14, 1–34.
Los, B.: 2004, ‘Identification of strategic industries: a dynamic perspective’. Papers in
Regional Science 83, 669–698.
Magtibay-Ramos, N., G. Estrada, and J. Felipe: 2008, ‘An input-output analysis of the
Philippine BPO industry’. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 22, 41–56.
Meller, P. and M. Marfa´n: 1981, ‘Small and large industry: employment generation,
linkages and key sectors’. Economic Development and Cultural Change 29, 263–274.
Midmore, P., M. Munday, and A. Roberts: 2006, ‘Assessing industry linkages using re-
gional input-output tables’. Regional Studies 40, 329–343.
39
Miller, R. E. and P. D. Blair: 2009, Input-Output Analysis: Foundations and Extensions.
Cambridge University Press, 2 edition. forthcoming.
Miller, R. E. and M. L. Lahr: 2001, ‘A taxonomy of extractions’. In: M. L. Lahr and R. E.
Miller (eds.): Regional Science Perspectives in Economics: A Festschrift in Memory of
Benjamin H. Stevens. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp. 407–441.
Oosterhaven, J. and K. R. Polenske: 2009, ‘Modern regional input-output and impact
analyses’. In: R. Capello and P. Nijkamp (eds.): Handbook of Regional Growth and
Development Theories. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 423–439.
Owen, G.: 1977, ‘Values of games with a priori unions’. In: R. Hein and O. Moeschlin
(eds.): Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. New-York: Springer, pp.
76–88.
Owen, G.: 1981, ‘Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman index for games with a priori
unions’. In: M. Holler (ed.): Power, Voting, and Voting Power. Wu˝rzburg, Germany:
Physica-Verlag, pp. 232–238.
Owen, G. and E. Winter: 1992, ‘The multilinear extension and the coaliton structure
value’. Games and Economic Behavior 4, 582–587.
Paelinck, J., J. de Caevel, and D. J.: 1965, ‘Analyse Quantitative de Certaines Phe´nome`nes
du De´veloppment Re´gional Polarise´: Essai de Simulation Statique d’ite´rarires de Pro-
pogation’. In: Proble´mes de Conversion E´conmique: Analyses The´oretiques et E´tudes
Applique´es. Paris, pp. 341–387, M.-Th. Ge´nin.
Polenske, K. R.: 2004, ‘Leotief’s ”magnificent machine” and other contributions to applied
economics’. In: E. Dietzenbacher and M. L. Lahr (eds.): Wassily Leontief and Input-
Output Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 9–29.
Porter, M. E.: 1990, Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York, NY: Free Press.
Rasmussen, P. N.: 1956, Studies in Inter-Sectoral Relations. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Roberts, B. M.: 1995, ‘Structural change in Poland, 1980-90: evidence from social ac-
counting multipliers and linkage analysis’. Applied Economics 7, 291–308.
Rose, A.: 1995, ‘Input-output economics and computable general equilibrium models’.
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 6, 295–304.
Roth, A. E. (ed.): 1988, The Shapley Value. Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press.
Sabidussi, G.: 1966, ‘The centrality index of a graph’. Psychometrica 31, 581–603.
Sa´nchez-Cho´liz, J. and R. Duarte: 2003, ‘Analyzing pollution by way of vertically in-
tegrated coefficients, with an application to the water sector in Aragon’. Cambridge
Journal of Economics 27, 433–448.
Schultz, S.: 1977, ‘Approaches to identifying key sectors empirically by means of input-
output analysis’. Journal of Development Studies 14, 77–96.
40
Shapley, L. S.: 1953, ‘A value for n-person games’. In: H. Kuhn and A. Tucker (eds.):
Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, pp. 307–317.
Shapley, L. S.: 1962, ‘Simple games: an outline of the descriptive theory’. Behavioral
Science 7, 59–66.
Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik: 1954, ‘A method for evaluating the distribution of the
power in a committee system’. American Political Science Review 48, 787–792.
Sherman, J. and W. J. Morrison: 1950, ‘Adjustment of an inverse matrix corresponding
to a change in one element of a given matrix’. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 21,
124–127.
Song, Y. and C. Liu: 2007, ‘An input-output approach for measuring real estate sector
linkages’. Journal of Property Research 24, 71–91.
Song, Y., C. Liu, and G. Langston: 2006, ‘Linkage measures of the construction sector
using the hypothetical extraction method’. Construction Management and Economics
24, 579–589.
Sonis, M., J. J. Guilhoto, G. J. Hewings, and E. B. Martins: 1995, ‘Linkages, key sectors,
and structural change: some new perspectives’. Developing Economies 33, 233–270.
Sonis, M. and G. J. Hewings: 1989, ‘Error and sensitivity input-output analysis: a new
approach’. In: R. E. Miller, K. R. Polenske, and A. Z. Rose (eds.): Frontiers of Input-
Output Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 232–244.
Sonis, M. and G. J. Hewings: 1992, ‘Coefficient change in input-output models: theory
and applications’. Economic Systems Research 4, 143–157.
Stephenson, K. and M. Zelen: 1989, ‘Rethinking centrality: methods and examples’. Social
Networks 11, 1–37.
Straffin, P. D.: 1977, ‘Homogeneity, independence, and power indices’. Public Choice 30,
107–118.
Straffin, P. D.: 1988, ‘The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities’. In:
A. E. Roth (ed.): The Shapley value. Essays in Honot of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 71–81.
Strassert, G.: 1968, ‘Zur bestimmung strategischer sektoren mit hilfe von von input-output
modellen’. Jahrbu˝cher fu˝r Nationalo˝konomie und Statistik 182, 211–215.
Suh, S. (ed.): 2009, Handbook of Input-Output Economics in Industrial Ecology. Heidel-
berg: Springer.
Temurshoev, U.: 2008, ‘Who’s who in networks. Wanted: the key group’. Net Institute
Working Paper 08-08.
Ten Raa, T.: 2005, The Economics of Input-Output Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge
Univeristy Press.
41
van der Laan, G. and R. van den Brink: 1998, ‘Axiomatization of a class of share functions
for n-person games’. Theory and Decision 44, 117–148.
van der Laan, G. and R. van den Brink: 2002, ‘A Banzhaf share function for cooperative
games in coaltion structure’. Theory and Decision 53, 61–86.
Wasserman, S. and K. Faust: 1994, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Winter, E.: 1989, ‘A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation’.
International Journal of Game Theory 18, 227–240.
Winter, E.: 1992, ‘The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition struc-
ture’. Games and Economic Behavior 4, 132–144.
Winter, E.: 2002, ‘The Shapley value’. In: R. J. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.): The Handbook
of Game Theory. North-Holland, pp. 2026–2052.
Yotopoulos, P. A. and J. B. Nugent: 1973, ‘A balanced-growth version of the linkage
hypothesis: a test’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, 157–171.
Zeng, L.: 2001, ‘A property of the Leontief inverse and its applications to comparative
static analysis’. Economic Systems Research 13, 299–315.
42
